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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
creditor is privy to the judgment debtor.20 Whether or not the
trust deed preceded the lien in point of time is immaterial; even
though the judgment lien had priority, this would not prevent the
land from passing to the grantee by estoppel subject to the
judgment lien.2 '
The general rule is that estoppel by deed must be specially
pleaded in order to be availed of.22 From the opinion it does not
appear that there was such a plea; therefore the court could not
have considered it.
J. H. H.
MASTER AND SERvANT - LiABn OF MASTM FOR SERVANT'S
NEGLIGENCE IN DRIVING M1ASTER'S CAR TO SERVANT's HomIE. - The
sales-manager of the used car departmeht of the defendant com-
pany had the right to use the cars of the company for his owh
personal purposes as well as for business uses. After a "frolic of
his own," which terminated after working hours, he drove past the
used car department to see if all the cars were in for the night. On
the way home from there (a number of blocks from the place of
business) he negligently ran over the plaintiff, who recovered
judgment against the driver and the defendant company, owner of
the car. The owner appealed contending that the court should
have directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
salesman was not at the time acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. Held, that the question whether or not the driver was actt-
ing within the scope of his employment was properly submitted to
the jury. Judgment was reversed on other grounds. Meyn v. Du-
laney-Mifler Auto Go.-
In its opinion the court states that generally where a servant
has permission to use a car in order better to execute his business
2 
oEgnor v. Roberts, 191 S. E. 532 (W. Va. 1937), at a judicial sale, a pur-
chaser obtains the whole title and interest in the property sold, which was
vested in the owner at the time of the sale and no more. Freudenberger Oil
Co. v. Gardner, 79 W. Va. 46, 90 S. E. 815 (1916); Bennett v. Booth, 70 W.
Va. 264, 73 S. E. 909 (1912) ; Snyder v. Botkin, 37 W. Va. 355, 16 S. E. 591
(1892).
21 A debtor against whom there existed a judgment lien gave warranty deed
of land which he expected to inherit. The land subsequently descended and the
court held that the grantee took the land subject to the judgment lien.
Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. 467, 96 Pae. 945 (1908).
S2Estoppel by deed must be specially pleaded or considered as waived,
McCorkell v. Herron, 128 Iowa 324, 103 N. W. 988 (1905) ; Hanson v. Buckner,
4 Dana 251, 29 Am. Dec. 401 (Ky. 1836).
1 191 S. E. 558 (W. Va. 1937).
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to go to and from his meals and home, he is acting within the scope
of his employment. To support this statement, Goff v. Clarksburg
Dairy Co.,2 and other cases are cited,3 wherein the servant (with
the exception of two such cases cited) 4 has been found acting within
the scope of his employment while going to and from meals to work.
It is suggested that there may be a possible distinction between those
cases and the present one. The use of the car, with permission to
go to lunch and back to work is not such abandonment of employ-
ment (by virtue of the fact that the use is limited and that the
employee is to return to the place of business in a short time) as
in the principal case where the servant is free to use the car as he
chooses and need not return to the place of employment until the
following day.5
The cases cited by the court, doubtless represent the majority
opinion that servants going to and from meals are at such times
acting within the scope of their employment,( but do not afford a
basis, if the suggested distinction is valid, for the use of the words
"and home" in the statement of a general rule, if such words are
to be considered as meaning that employees going home after work
are at such times acting within the scope of their employment.
There are reputable authorities holding that a servant, who
after the day's work is over takes his employer's car for his con-
venience to his own home, is not acting within the scope of his
employment.7  In Keck v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co,,S an em-
2 86 W. Va. 237, 103 S. E. 58 (1928).
3 Brennan v. Whita Motor Co., 210 App. Div. 533, 206 N. Y. Supp. 544 (1924);
Depue v. Salmon Co., 92 N. J. L. 550, 106 Atl. 379 (1919) ; and others cited by
the court.
4 Depue v. Salmon Co., 92 N. J. L. 550, 106 Atl. 379 (1919). Dunbaden
v. Castles Ice Cream Co., 103 N. J. L. 427, 135 Atl. 886 (1927).
z Keck v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 179 Ky. 314, 200 S. W. 452 (1918);
Bloom v. Krueger, 182 Wis. 29, 195 N. W. 851 (1923); Hnlsey v. Metz, 93
S. W. (2d) 41, 44 (Mo. App. 1936), wherein the court says: "The general rule
is that a servant using an automobile or other conveyance, whether belonging to
his master or to himself in going to and from his place of work, is not at such
times engaged in work for his master but acts for his own purposes only.II
6 Contra: Carnes v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 69 P. (2d) 998 (Cal. App. 1937);
Martinelli v. Stabnan, 11 Cal. App. 38, 52 P. (2d) 956 (1936) ; Bloom v. Krue-
ger, 182 Wis. 29, 195 N. W. 851 (1923).
72 BrLAsHpiELD, CYCLOPEDIA oF AUTOMOBIum LAw (1927) 1422; Miller v. Na-
tional Auto Sales Co., 177 IBl. App. 367 (1913); Lee v. Nathan, 67 Cal. App.
111, 226 Pac. 970 (1924) ; Barton v. Radford Grocery Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 801
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Keck v. Gas & Electric Co., 179 Ky. 314, 200 S. W.
452 (1918) ; McCormack Bros. Motor Co. v. Holland, 218 Ala. 200, 118 So. 387
(1928); Swanson etc. Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 79 Ind. App. 321, 138 N. E. 262
(1923). Contra: Krousel v. Thieme, 13 La. App. 680, 128 So. 670 '(1930)
(where the driver admitted he would have sold the car at any time); Ford v.
2
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ployee who had the use of a motorcycle for business during the day
and who drove it home at night with the employer's permission
was held not to be acting within the scope of his employment on his
way home from work. It is arguable that where as here the
servant is free to use the car for his own purposes, such use is not
incidental to the employmenty Had the servant been headed for
the "frolic" from the place of business instead of going home,
surely the defendant would not have been liable.
W. G. W.
M ASTER AND SERVANT - LOAN OF SERVANT TO THIRD PERSON
- LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INJURIES TO STRANGERS BY THE SERV-
ANT. - The defendant coal company was supplied with electric
power by the Appalachian Power Company whose transformer was
situated upon the defendant's land. The power company had
given a key to the transformer station to H, defendant's chief
electrician hired and paid by the defendant. A fire broke out in
a store three miles away from the transformer, and as a result of
the fire a wire leading to it was burned down blowing a fuse at
the transformer causing the lights to die in the defendant's "coal
camp." Defendant's assistant superintendent ordered H to re-
place the fuse. Upon the replacement electricity again circulated
through the fallen line. Plaintiff's decedent, in aiding at the fire,
became entangled with the wire and was electrocuted. Held, that
the defendant was liable for H's negligence in replacing the fuse.
Graft v. Pocahontas Goal Corporation.1
In arriving at a decision there are many difficulties in cases
which involve more than one employer. The rule is well estab-
Reinoehl, 120 Pa. Super. 285, 182 Atl. 120 (1935) (where the salesman stopped
for supper on his way back to the place of business) ; Buckley v. Harkens, 114
Wash. 468, 195 Pac. 250 (1921) (where the company paid the expenses of the
salesman's car).
R Keck v. Gas & Electric Co., 179 Ky. 314, 200 S. W. 452 (1918).
1 "An act of kindness on the part of the employer under such circumstances,
while it may create a spirit of loyalty in the relationship existing between the
employee and the master, cannot be construed to operate as a continuance of
the relationship during a period where, under the law and the facts, such rela-
tionship has actually been suspended." Bloom v. Krueger, 182 Wis. 29, 32,
195 X. W. 851 (1923). Where the employee used the master's car to go home
to lunch, with permission of the master, RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 229,
a comment on the rule of the section says: 'If, however, such acts [furnish-
ing an employee with a car] are for the personal convenience of the employees
and are merely permitted by the master in order to make the employment more
desirable, the acts are not within the scope of employment." Id. at 511.
1190 S. E. 687 (W. Va. 1937).
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